Monday, August 13, 2007

Early NL Series: Intro and Run Estimation

My major interest in baseball research is theoretical sabermetrics. The “theoretical” label sounds a bit arrogant, but what I mean is that I am interested particularly in questions of what would happen at extremes that do not occur with the usual seasonal Major League data that many people analyze (for instance, RC works fine for normal teams, and so does 10 runs = 1 win as a rule of thumb. You don’t really need BsR or Pythagenpat for those types of situations--they can help sharpen your analysis, but you won’t go too far off track without them.) Thus my interest in run and win estimation at the extremes, as well as evaluation of extreme batters (yes, I still have about five installments in the Rate Stat series to write, and yes, I will get around to it, but when, I don’t know). Secondary to that is using sabermetrics to increase my understanding of the baseball world around me (example, how valuable is Chipper Jones? What are the odds that the Tigers win the World Series? Who got the better of the Brewers/Rangers trade?). I don't do this a whole lot here because there are dozens and dozens of people who do that kind of stuff, and I wouldn't be able to add any added insight. But a close third is using sabermetrics to evaluate the players and teams of the past. Particularly, I am interested in applying sabermetric analysis to the earliest days of what we now call major league baseball.

A few years ago, and again recently, I turned my attention to the National Association, the first loose major league of openly professional players that operated from 1871-1875. However, this league, as anyone who has attempted to statistically analyze it will know, was a mess. Teams played 40 games in a season; some dropped out after 10, some were horrifically bad, Boston dominated the league, etc. All of these factors make it difficult to develop the kind of sabermetric tools (run estimators, win estimators, baselines) that we use in present day analysis. So I finally threw my hands up and gave up (Dan Rosenheck came up with a BsR formula that worked better for the NA then anything I did, but there are limitations of the data that are hard to overcome). For now, it is probably best to eyeball the stats of NA players and teams and use common sense, as opposed to attempting to apply rigorous analytical structures to them.

Anyway, when things start to settle down, you have the National League, founded in 1876. I should note at this point that while I am interested in nineteenth-century baseball, I am by no means an expert on it, and so you should not be too surprised if I butcher the facts or make faulty assumptions, or call Cap Anson “Cap Anderson”. If you want a great historical presentation of old-time baseball, the best place to go is David Nemec’s The Great Encyclopedia of Nineteenth Century Major League Baseball. I believe that a revised edition of this book has been published recently, but I have the first edition. It is really a great book, similar in format to my favorite of the 20th century baseball encyclopedias, The Sports Encyclopedia: Baseball (or Neft/Cohen if you prefer). Like that work, only basic statistics are presented (no OPS+ or Pitching Runs, etc.), but you get the complete roster of each team each year, games by position, etc. And just like Neft/Cohen, there is a text summary of every season’s major stories, although Nemec writes these over the course of four or five pages, with pictures and trivial anecdotes, as opposed to the several paragraphs in the Neft/Cohen book. I wholeheartedly recommend the Nemec encyclopedia to anybody interested in the 19th century game.

That digression aside, the 1876 National League is still a different world then what we have today. The season is 60 games long, one team goes 9-56, pitchers are throwing from a box 45 feet away from the plate, it takes a zillion balls to draw a walk, overhand pitching is illegal, etc. But thankfully, you can make some sense of the statistics of this league, and while our tools don’t work as well, due to the competitive imbalance, the lack of important data that we have for later seasons, the shorter sample sizes as a result of a shorter season, etc., they can work to a level of precision that makes me comfortable to present their findings, with repeated caveats about how inaccurate they are compared to similar tools today. For the National Association, I could never reach that level of confidence.

What I intend to do over the course of this series is to look at the National League each season from 1876-1881. I chose 1881 for a couple reasons, the first being that during those seven seasons the NL had no other contenders to “major league” status (although many historians believe that other teams in other leagues would have been competitive with them--it's not like taking today’s Los Angeles Dodgers against the Vero Beach Dodgers). Also, in Bill James’ Historical Data Group Runs Created formulas, 1876-1881 is covered under one period (although 1882 and 1883 are included as well). That James found that he could put these seasons under one RC umbrella lead me to believe that the same could be done for BsR and a LW method as well. I will begin by looking at the runs created methodology here.

Run estimation is a little tricky as you go back in time. Unfortunately, there is no play-by-play database that we can use to determine empirical linear weights, and some important data is missing (SB and CS particularly). The biggest missing piece of the offensive puzzle though is reached base on error, which for simplicity’s sake I will just refer to as errors from hereon. In the 1880 NL, for instance, the fielding average was .901, and there were 8.67 fielding errors per game (for both teams). One hundred years later, the figures were .978 and 1.74. So you have something like five times as many errors being made as you do in the modern game.

When looking at modern statistics, you can ignore the error from an offensive perspective pretty safely. It will undoubtedly improve the accuracy of your run estimator if you can include it, but only very slightly, and the data is not widely available so we just ignore it, as we sometimes ignore sacrifice hits and hit batters and other minor events. But when there are as many errors as there were in the 1870s, you can’t ignore that. If you use a modern formula like ERP, and find the necessary multiplier, you will automatically inflate the value of all of the other events, because there has to be compensation somewhere for all of the runs being created as a result of errors.

So far as I know, there is only one published run estimator for this period. Bill James’ HDG-1 formula covers 1876-1883, and is figured as:
RC = (H + W)*(TB*1.2 + W*.26 + (AB-K)*.116)/(AB + W)
Bill decided to leave base runners as the modern estimate of H+W, and then try to account somewhat for errors by giving all balls in play extra advancement value. If you use the total offensive stats of the period to find the implicit linear weights, this is what you get:
RC = .730S + 1.066D + 1.402T + 1.739HR + .434W - .1081(AB - H - K) - .1406K

As you can see, the value of each event is inflated against our modern expectation of what they should be. I should note here that, of course, we don’t expect the 1870s weights to be the same as or even that similar to the modern weights. The coefficients do and should change as the game changes. That said, though, we have to be suspicious of a homer being valued at 1.74 runs and a triple at 1.40. The home run has a fairly constant value and it would take a very extreme context to lift its value so high. Scoring is high in this period (5.4 runs/game), but a lot of that logically has to be due to the extra errors. Three and a half extra errors per team game is like adding another 3.5 hits--it's going to be a factor in increased scoring.

To test RMSE for run estimators, I figured the error per (AB - H). I did this because I did not want the ever changing schedule length to unduly effect the RMSE. Of course, this does introduce the potential for problems because AB-H is much less a good proxy for outs in this period then it is today, as I will discuss shortly. I then multiplied the per out figure by 2153 (the average number of AB-H for a team in the 1876-1883 NL). In any case, doing this versus just taking the straight RMSE against actual runs scored did not make a big difference. Bill’s formula came in at 35.12 while the linearization was 30.65.

Of course what I wanted to do was figure out a Base Runs formula that worked for this period, as BsR is the most flexible and theoretically sound run estimator out there. What I decided to do was use Tango Tiger’s full modern formula and attempt to estimate some data that was missing and throw out other categories that would be much more difficult to estimate. I wound up estimating errors, sacrifice hits, wild pitches, and passed balls but throwing out steals, CS, intentional walks, hit batters, etc. Some of those events were subject to constantly changing rules and strategy (stolen bases and sacrifices were not initially a big part of the professional game) or didn’t even yet exist (Did teams issue intentional walks when it took 8 balls to give the batter first base? I am not a historian, but I doubt it. Hit batters did not result in a free pass until the 1887 in the NL). In the end, I came up with these estimates:

ERRORS: In modern baseball, approximately 65% of all errors result in a reached base on error for the offense. I (potentially dubiously) assumed that a similar percentage held in the 1870s, and used 70%. Then I simply figured x as 70% of the league fielding errors, per out in play (AB-H-K). x was allowed to be a different value for each season. Some may object to this as it hones in too much on the individual year and I certainly can understand such a position. However, the error rates were fluctuating during this period. In 1876 the league FA was .866; in 1877 it was up to .884; then .893, .892, .901, .905, .897, and .891. These differences are big enough to suggest that fundamental changes in the game may have been occurring from year-to-year.

James’ method had no such yearly correction, and if you force the BsR formula I will present later to use a constant x value of .134 (i.e. 13.4% of outs in play resulted in ROE), its RMSE will actually be around a run and a half higher then that of the linearization of RC. I still think that there are plenty of good reasons to use the BsR formula instead, but in the interests of intellectual honesty, I did not want to omit that fact.

It is entirely possible that a better estimate for errors could be found; there is no reason to assume that every batter is equally likely to reach on an error once they’ve made an out in play. In fact, I am sure that some smart mind could come along and come up with better estimates then I have in a number of different areas, and blow my formula right out of the water. I welcome further inquiry into this by others and look forward to my formula being annihilated. So don’t take any of this as a finished product or some kind of divine truth (not that you should with my other work either).

SACRIFICES: The first league to record sacrifices, so far as I can tell, was the American Association in 1883 and 1884. In those leagues, there was .0323 and .0327 SH per single, walk, and estimated ROE. So I assumed SH = .0325*(S + W + E) would be an acceptable estimate in the early NL. NOTE: Wow, did I screw the pooch on this one. The AA DID NOT track sacrifices in '83 and '84. I somehow misread the HB column as SH. We do no thave SH data until 1895 in the NL. So the discussion that follows is of questionable accuracy.

I did this some tie ago without thinking it through completely; in early baseball, innovations were still coming quickly, and it is possible that in the seven year interval, the sacrifice frequency changed wildly. George Wright recalled in 1915 (quoted in Bill James’ New Historical Baseball Abstract, pg. 10): “Batting was not done as scientifically in those days as now. The sacrifice hit was unthought of and the catcher was not required to have as good a throwing arm because no one had discovered the value of the stolen base.”

On the other hand, 1883 is pretty close to the end of our period, so while the frequency may well have increased over time, the estimate should at least be pretty good near the end of the line. One could also quibble with the choice of estimating sacrifices as a percentage of times on first base when, if sacrifices are not recorded, they are in actuality a subset of AB-H-K. Maybe an estimate based both on times on first and outs in play would work best. Again, there are a lot of judgment calls that go into constructing the formula, and so there are lots of areas for improvement.

WP and PB: These were kept by the NL, and there were .0355 WP per H+W-HR+E and .0775 PB per the same. So, the estimates are WP = .0355*(H + W - HR + E) and PB = .0775*(H + W - HR + E).

Then I simply plugged these estimates into Tango’s BsR formula. D of course was home runs, while A = H + W - HR + E + .08SH and C = AB - H - E + .92SH. The encouraging thing about this exercise was that the B factor only needed a multiplier of 1.087 (after including a penalty of .05 for outs) to predict the correct number of total runs scored. Ideally, if Base Runs was a perfect model of scoring (obviously it is not), we could use the same formula with any dataset, given all of the data, and not have to fudge the B component. The fact that we only had to fudge by 1.087 (compared to Bill James who to make his Basic RC work had to add walks into the B factor, take 120% of total bases, and add 11.6% of balls in play to B), could indicate that the BsR formula holds fairly well for this time when we add important, more common events like SH, errors, WP, and PB. Of course, perhaps Bill could get similar results using a more technical RC formula + estimation. The bottom line is, a fudge of only 1.087 will keep the linear weights fairly close to what we expect today. I don’t know for sure that they should be, but I’d rather error on the side of our expectations as opposed to a potentially quixotic quest to produce the lowest possible RMSE for a sample of sixty teams playing an average of 78 games each.

So the B formula is:
B = (.726S + 1.948D + 3.134T + 1.694HR + .052W + .799E + .727SH + 1.165WP + 1.174PB - .05(AB - H - E))*1.087

The RMSE of this formula by the standard above is 28.18. I got as low as 24.61 by increasing the outs weight to -.2, but I was not comfortable with the ramifications of this. As mentioned before, if one does not allow each year to have a unique ROE per OIP ratio, the RMSE is a much worse 32.20. Again, I feel a differently yearly factor is appropriate, but can certainly see if some feel this is an unfair advantage for this estimator when comparing it to others. The error of approximately 30 runs is a far cry from the errors around 23 in modern baseball, plus the season was shorter and the teams in this period averaged only 421 runs/season, so the raw number makes it seem smaller then it actually is. As I said before, you should always be aware of the inaccuracies when using any sabermetric method, but those caveats are even more important to keep in mind here.

Another way to consider the error is as a percentage of the runs scored by the team. This is figured as ABS(R-RC)/R. For sake of comparison, basic ERP, when used on all teams 1961-2002 (except 1981 and 1994), has an average absolute error of 2.7%. The BsR formula here, applied to all NL teams 1876-1883, has an AAE of 5.4%, twice that value. So once again I will stress that the methods used here are nowhere near as accurate as the similar methods used in our own time. Just for kicks, the largest error is a whopping 24.2% for the 1876 Cincinnati entry, which scored 238 runs but was projected to score 296. The best estimate is for Buffalo in 1882; they actually scored 500 versus a prediction of 501.

Before I move on too far, I have a little example that will illustrate the enormous effect of errors in this time and place. In modern baseball, there are pretty much exactly 27 outs per game, and approximately 25.2 of these are AB-H. We recognize, of course, that ROE in our own time are included in this batting out figure, and should not be, but any distortion is small and can basically be ignored.

Picking a random year, in the 1879 NL, we know that there were 27.09 outs/game since we have the innings pitched figure. How many batting outs were there per game? Well, if the modern rule of thumb held, there should be just about 25.2. There were 28.01. So there are more batting outs per game then there are total outs in the game. With our error estimate subtracted (so that batting outs = AB - H - E), we estimate 24.60. Now this may well be too low, or just right, or what have you. Maybe I it should have been 50% of errors put a runner on first base instead of 70%. I don’t know. What I do know is that if you pretend errors do not exist, you are going to throw all of your measures for this time and place out of whack. Errors were too big of a factor in the game to just be ignored as we can do today.

Let’s take a look at the linear values produced by the Base Runs formula, as applied to the entire period:
Runs = .551S + .843D + 1.126T + 1.404HR + .390W + .569E + .081SH + .280PB + .278WP - .145(AB - H - E)

This is why I felt much more comfortable with the BsR formula I chose, despite the fact that there were versions with better accuracy. These weights would not be completely off-base if we found them for modern baseball. Whether or not they are the best weights for 1876-1883, we will have to wait for when brighter minds tackle the problem or when PBP data is available and we can empirically see what they are. But to me, it is preferable to accept greater error in team seasonal data but keep our common sense knowledge of what events are worth rather then to chase greater accuracy but distort the weights.

This is still not the formula that I am going to apply to players, though. For that, I will use the linear version for that particular season. Additionally, for players, SH, PB, and WP will be broken back down into their components. What I mean is that we estimate that a SH is worth .081 runs, and we estimated that there are .0325 SH for every S, W, and E. .081*.0325 = .0026, and therefore, for every single, walk, and error we’ll add an additional .0026 runs. So a single will be worth .551+.0026 = .554 runs. We’ll also distribute the PB and WP in a similar way.

There are some drawbacks to doing it this way. If Ross Barnes hits 100 singles, his team may in fact lay down 3.25 more sacrifices. But it will be his teammates doing the sacrificing, not him. And we would assume that good hitters would sacrifice less then poor hitters, and this method assumes they are all doing it equally.

On the other hand, though, we are just doing something similar in spirit to what a theoretical team approach does--crediting the change in the team’s stats as a direct result of the player to the player. Besides, there’s really no other fair way to do it (we don’t want to get into estimating SH as a function of individual stats, and even if we did, we have no individual SH data for this period to test against). Also, in the end, the extra weight added to each event will be fairly small, and I am much more comfortable doing it with the battery errors which should be fairly randomly distributed with regards to which particular player is on base when they occur.

Then there is the matter of the error. Since the error is done solely as a function of AB-H-K, we could redistribute it, and come up with a different value for a non-K out and a K out, and write errors out of the formula, and have a mathematically equivalent result. However, I am not going to do this because I believe that, as covered previously, errors are such an important part of this game that we should recognize them, and maybe even include them in On Base Average (I have not in my presentation here, but I wouldn’t object if someone did) in order to remember that they are there. I think that keeping errors in the formula gives a truer picture of the linear weight value of each event as well, as it allows us to remember that the error is worth a certain number of runs and that outs, actual outs, have a particular negative value. Hiding this by lowering the value of an out seems to erase information to me.

I mentioned earlier that each year will have a different x to estimate errors in the formula x(AB-H-K). They are: 1876 = .1531, 1877 = .1407, 1878 = .1368, 1879 = .1345, 1880 = .1256, 1881 = .1184.

At this point, let me present the weights for the league as a whole in each year in 1876-1881, and then the ones with SH, PB, and WP stripped out and reapportioned across the other events. The first set is presented as (S, D, T, HR, W, E, AB-H-E, SH, PB, WP). The second is presented as (S, D, T, HR, W, E, AB-H-E).

1876: .552, .853, 1.146, 1.417, .386, .570, -.147, .085, .289, .287
1876: .588, .886, 1.178, 1.417, .422, .606, -.147
1877: .563, .862, 1.152, 1.414, .398, .581, -.153, .079, .287, .285
1877: .598, .894, 1.184, 1.414, .433, .616, -.153
1878: .546, .846, 1.138, 1.417, .380, .564, -.144, .087, .289, .287
1878: .581, .879, 1.171, 1.417, .415, .599, -.144
1879: .543, .830, 1.108, 1.397, .385, .560, -.140, .082, .275, .273
1879: .577, .861, 1.139, 1.397, .419, .594, -.140
1880: .537, .825, 1.105, 1.400, .378, .554, -.137, .086, .277, .275
1880: .571, .856, 1.136, 1.400, .412, .588, -.137
1881: .560, .859, 1.149, 1.415, .395, .578, -.151, .080, .287, .285
1881: .595, .891, 1.182, 1.415, .430, .613, -.151

Next installment, I’ll talk a little bit about replacement level, the defensive spectrum, and park factors.

Tuesday, August 07, 2007

Career Walk Rates (an excuse to make a quick point)

Putting aside my attempt at being an objective analyst for a moment, my favorite offensive event is the walk, and my favorite kind of players are those that walk a lot. So I’m just going to do a quick look at some walk-focused derived career statistics for a those major leaguers with 5000 AB between 1901 and 2005 as a vehicle to talk about a couple. Also, please note that there are no new insights in this post; these are not ideas that originated with me or are unique. And it is really just a space-filler, to justify this post’s existence, so that I can complain about a certain quickie stat that people use.

Right off the bat, I’m going to ignore hit batters and sacrifices. So the only events being considered are at bats and walks in this analysis. Now, if you want to determine a player’s propensity to walk, what is the first possible statistic that comes to mind? I think if you’re like most people, you would say the percentage of plate appearances in which the hitter walked. And I think you would be right. So here are the top and bottom ten in Walk Percentage, W/(AB + W):
1. Ted Williams (20.8)
2. Barry Bonds (20.2)
3. Babe Ruth (19.7)
4. Eddie Yost (18.0)
5. Mickey Mantle (17.6)
6. Mark McGwire (17.6)
7. Jim Thome (17.5)
8. Frank Thomas (17.4)
9. Joe Morgan (16.7)
10. Rickey Henderson (16.7)
….
591. Kitty Bransfield (4.2)
592. Manny Sanguillen (4.2)
593. Tim Foli (4.2)
594. Enos Cabell (4.2)
595. Everett Scott (4.0)
596. Hal Chase (3.6)
597. Art Fletcher (3.5)
598. Ozzie Guillen (3.5)
599. Shawon Dunston (3.3)
600. George Stovall (3.2)

Obviously, we could get into league adjustments, park adjustments, or at least equivalent run values (as I did with the “Gavvys” for home runs), but that would be defeating the point of this post, which is not to look at the career lists as much as it is to discuss the construction of the stats themselves.

Another measure you’ll see people look at sometimes is what is sometimes called isolated walks, or on base extension, or other names, but is simply OBA-BA. It seems reasonable enough at first glance; OBA measures times on base by hits and walks, BA measures the frequency of hits per at bat, so the difference should tell you something about walk frequency. What kind of list does that make?
1. Barry Bonds (.141)
2. Ted Williams (.136)
3. Eddie Yost (.134)
4. Babe Ruth (.130)
5. Mark McGwire (.129)
6. Jim Thome (.126)
7. Mickey Mantle (.124)
8. Joe Morgan (.122)
9. Earl Torgeson (.121)
10. Frank Thomas (.121)

Obviously, this is a similar list, but not in the same order. Why is this? Well, what is OBA-BA?
(H + W)/(AB + W) - H/AB. BA and OBA have different denominators, so it is not exactly clear what this is measuring. But with a little bit of algebra, you can right “ISW” as:
ISW = W*(AB - H)/(AB*(AB + W))

As you can probably now see, this is a statistic that doesn’t really measure anything. Why are walks multiplied by outs in the numerator, and at bats multiplied by plate appearances in the denominator? Is there any logical explanation for this?

No, there isn’t. OBA-BA is just something that people use because they are lazy, and it obviously tracks the true walk rate well. But like OPS, it is a statistic that doesn’t have units; arguably unlike OPS, it doesn’t make even a bit of sense, despite generally tracking a useful thing (walking rate/frequency/ability).

You can fiddle with that ISW equation to further see what it winds up doing; if I rewrite it as the mathematically equivalent W/(AB + W)*(AB - H)/AB, and then rewrite (AB - H)/AB as the equivalent one minus batting average, you can see that:
ISW = W%*(1 - BA)

In other words, the more base hits you get, the worse you look in OBA-BA, despite an equal walk rate. I have never really seen it used for serious analysis, which is good because it never should be, and I don’t think there is any reason to ever use it.

If you just have the three major rate stats at your disposal, then you can calculate W% as (OBA - BA)/(1 - BA). Another quick walk stat you can use is walks per at bat. Now you have to be incredibly lazy to not want to add walks back into the denominator, but walks per at bat (which I’ll call WAB) does have a useful property, in that it ties into what I have always considered the “fourth rate stat”, secondary average, which is equal to ISO + WAB if you ignore stolen bases. What kind of career list does WAB give?
1. Ted Williams (.262)
2. Barry Bonds (.253)
3. Babe Ruth (.246)
4. Eddie Yost (.220)
5. Mickey Mantle (.214)
6. Mark McGwire (.213)
7. Jim Thome (.212)
8. Frank Thomas (.211)
9. Joe Morgan (.201)
10. Rickey Henderson (.200)

As you can see, this is the exact same order as the W% list. And if you understand the math, this is no surprise. Remember, we eliminated all extraneous categories (HB, SH, SF, INT) from consideration, so there are only at bats and walks. Therefore, W/AB is just the ratio form of the stat, where W% is the percentage version. That may be unclear; if so, consider:
Winning % = W/(W + L) Win Ratio = W/L
Walk % = W/(W + AB) WAB = W/AB

Win % is to win ratio as Walk % is to WAB. This is true of all ratios and percentages, mathematically, but I thought that using another example from baseball might help people see this. Therefore, W% and WAB are directly related--W% = WAB/(1 + WAB) and WAB = W%/(1 - W%). They will always produce the same list in order, and while W% is probably a more intuitive and useful form, WAB is the ratio of walks to non-walks, which can be a legitimate form of the stat. And if for some reason you want to get WAB from the basic rate stats, WAB = (OBA - BA)/(1 - OBA).

Anyway, one other walk stat that I do like is an estimate of the percentage of runs created derived from walks. You can do this pretty easily with a linear RC formula, and it has been done by many other sabermetricians in the past. It is sort of a junk stat, but it is a fun way to find players who may not have historically high walk rates but depended on the walk to contribute to their teams.

I am going to use one RC formula for the whole century; essentially Paul Johnson’s ERP (TB + .8H + W - .3AB)*.324. You can of course expand that out to see the weight on each event, but all that we care about here is that a walk is worth .32 runs. So .32*W/RC = percentage of RC derived from walks, which I will call %W:
1. Donie Bush, 44.5 %W, 13.8 W%
2. Eddie Yost, 44.5, 18.0
3. Miller Huggins, 44.3, 15.3
4. Eddie Joost, 42.0, 15.7
5. Mark Belanger, 38.1, 9.1
6. Earl Torgeson, 37.5, 16.5
7. Elmer Valo, 37.1, 15.8
8. Rickey Henderson, 36.9, 16.7
9. Joe Morgan, 36.9, 16.7
10. Burt Shotton, 36.6, 12.6

As you can see, the top of this list is largely made up of middling or poor hitters, as the great walkers like Ruth and Bonds and Mantle created a lot of runs by walking, but also many by getting base hits and hitting for power. Mark Belanger’s 9.1 W% is quite pedestrian, but he brought little else to the table as a hitter, and so a large share of his value did come from walking.

591. Manny Sanguillen, 11.6, 4.2
592. George Stovall, 11.6, 3.2
593. George Sisler, 11.5, 5.4
594. Heinie Zimmerman, 11.4, 4.4
595. Art Fletcher, 11.3, 3.5
596. Dante Bichette, 11.3, 5.3
597. Joe Medwick, 11.0, 5.4
598. Hal Chase, 10.3, 3.6
599. Garret Anderson, 10.2, 4.5
600. Shawon Dunston, 9.4, 3.3

Some good players, some bums, some crooks, a Coors Field fraud, a Michigians; all in all, a group of players that I love to hate.

The takeaway here is that if you’re going to figure a walk rate stat from BA and OBA, then for pete’s sake (Rose? Alexander? Schourek?), please use (OBA - BA)/(1 - OBA) or (OBA - BA)/(1 - BA), not the unitless and nonsensical OBA-BA.

Tuesday, July 31, 2007

My Top 60 Starters, 1-10

10. Eddie Plank (.594 NW%, 127 ARA, +52, +115)
9. Warren Spahn (.584, 120, +46, +119)
8. Lefty Grove (.650, 143, +66, +120)
7. Greg Maddux (.599, 131, +60, +124)
6. Tom Seaver (.611, 130, +62, +128)
5. Christy Mathewson (.635, 131, +62, +128)
4. Roger Clemens (.654, 141, +78, +145)
3. Pete Alexander (.643, 135, +78, +150)
2. Walter Johnson (.619, 141, +96, +179)
1. Cy Young (.621, 130, +93, +195)

PLANK: I believe that I have ranked Plank higher then most other rankings have, and so it deserves a bit of an explanation. The Sporting News ranked him 18th among pitchers who would be eligible for my list; Bill James ranked him 17th in career value for pitchers in 1985 and 34th in his rankings in 2001. He is 25th in Adjusted Pitching Wins as of the 2005 Palmer/Gillette Encyclopedia, and 33rd in Pitching Wins. So why is he tenth here?

Because I don’t see any reason why he shouldn’t be, at least with respect to the way I have ranked everyone else. The good justifications for dropping Plank that I can accept are based on looking at the definition of “top” in a different way or making a better attempt at isolating pitching from fielding support.

Plank’s NW-NL record is 309-211, which is good for 106 WCR. The only pitcher ranked below him on this list with more WCR is Randy Johnson. Plank can be seen as an earlier-day Spahn; a left-hander who never had the dominant seasons of some of the other greats, but was good for a long time. He had 14 seasons of >=5 WAR. Cy Young had 17, Mathewson 11, Alexander 15, Johnson 17…he was good for as long as his contemporaries were, but not as brilliant. Plank’s top 5 seasons only sum to +44 WAR, which is thirtieth among pitchers I have looked at; only Spahn ranks lower among the top ten. So he’s not going to blow anyone away on peak value, especially when you consider the era in which he pitched.

The more interesting thing on its face is why my WAA for Plank differs so much from Palmer’s. Palmer has him at +29, using earned runs CORRECTION: Greg Spira, an associate editor of the ESPN Baseball Encyclopedia, wrote to point out that Pete charges half of unearned runs to the pitcher. Shows what I get for not reading the glossary and assuming the methodology was the same as in some of his earlier works. Using earned runs instead of all runs, I get Plank down to +32. Plank allowed a smaller share of unearned runs then the league average during his time (75% of Plank’s runs were earned, 72% for the league), but that is a far cry from today when 90% of runs are earned. So I’m sure some will argue that using RA instead of ERA overvalues old-time pitchers, and there is some truth to that. But I think that using ERA is a band-aid, a poor substitute for attempting to estimate defense dependence in other ways.

GROVE: Grove suffers because of a shorter career then others, due partly to his stint in Baltimore, for which I do not credit him. You can see that in terms of WAA, he ranks fifth, and the higher baseline helps him. Either way, he’s the top southpaw of all-time in my book.

SEAVER & MATHEWSON: Bill James linked these two in the first Historical Abstract and was right on. I decided to go with Mathewson, but the fact that Seaver pitched sixty years later could make it very easy to justify him in front.

CLEMENS: Can he catch Alexander? He’s got him in rates and WAA, and he picked up four WAR last year, but that was pitching brilliantly. If he stays on the half season plan, it’ll be tough.

YOUNG: I am tempted to move Young down because of the fact that a lot of his value (97 WAR) is in the nineteenth century, and this is a post-1900 list, with the exception of guys like Young who pitched a significant amount after the turn of the century. Of course, that’s only about half of his value; you could make two top twenty pitchers out of him.

Tuesday, July 24, 2007

A Season in Three Acts

The Buckeyes’ 2007 season is best viewed in three pieces. A solid non-conference campaign, albeit against weak competition, that did nothing to dash the high hopes for the team; a disastrous (by OSU standards at least) conference campaign that saw the Buckeyes need to win their final game of the season to even finish sixth and earn a tournament berth; and an awesome tournament campaign, that saw Ohio sweep through the Big Ten Tournament in four (including a win over that state up north and two from perennial diamond rival Minnesota) exciting games, then give a good effort in the NCAAs, losing in the ninth to Lousiana-Lafayette, beating LeMoyne, and finally falling to Texas A&M.

Looking at the team statistics, OSU was third in W% at .613 (Minnesota led at .659), third in EW% at .573 (tsun led at .707), and fourth in PW% at .565 (tsun led at .701). Looking at the other conference teams, the only one that significantly deviated from the expected W%s was Purdue, actually .407 but with an EW% of .495 and a PW% of .581.

The big problem for OSU this season was a poor offense. Pitching injuries which I will discuss later were a big culprit as well, but the Buckeye attack was fairly average. Even adjusting for the 3% pitcher benefit that Bill Davis Stadium provides, the Bucks only averaged 6.2 R/G versus the average of 6.1, ranking fifth out of the ten squads. OSU did hit .316 versus an average of .308, and draw .109 walks/at bat versus an average of .104, both good for fourth in the conference. But power was lacking, as the Buckeyes’ ISO was just .089 against an average of .114, ninth in the conference. Power has been the Achilles’ heel of OSU for a couple years now, but never as starkly as in 2007.

The bad news for the Bucks going forward is that the top three hitters in terms of RAA are all gone. Junior CF Matt Angle was +20, hitting 366/458/454, pacing the team with 58 RC and a 9.4 RG; he was drafted by the Orioles in the seventh round and signed, joining Jedidiah Stephen in the organization. Senior 2B/SS/DH Jason Zoeller was +14 and popped 9 of the team’s 21 homers. Junior C Eric Fryer was not as good as he had been his first two seasons, but he was still plenty good enough to be drafted in the tenth round by the Brewers after a 322/407/448, +10 season.

Looking at the rest of the Buckeye offense, sophomore 1B Justin Miller continued to improve, emerging as an above average (+3 RAA) hitter, albeit a low secondary average for a first baseman. He may return to his original position of catcher next year in Fryer’s absence. At third, junior Tony Kennedy stepped in, hitting for little power but posting a .397 OBA and +5 runs. True freshman Brian DeLucia earned more time as the year progressed, and although he was average in 47 PA, showed good promise with the leather. I expect him to earn the job outright in ’08.

The middle infield situation was clouded all year, when finally a freshman double play combination emerged. Zoeller started the year at second with true freshman Cory Rupert at short. But Rupert’s hitting was very poor early, and his fielding not great either, so Zoeller moved to short and fellow true freshman Cory Kovanda was installed at second. Eventually, though, Zoeller’s defense was untenable (Zoeller was not great at second base, let alone short), and so he was shifted to DH and Rupert came back in. Neither Rupert or Kovanda hit well, but both seemed to be getting more comfortable at the end of the season, and were solid in the field then too. Rupert hit 257/283/303, -10 in 113 PA while Kovanda hit 289/352/325, -8 in 121 PA.

Left field was manned by sophomore JB Shuck most of the time, and he rapped out enough singles for a 342/397/401, +5 line marred by a terrible slump at the end of the season. Senior Jacob Howell often served as DH due to his continuing hamstring problems, hitting 322/371/429, +2 despite having limited use of his excellent speed. That left a spot for freshman Ryan Dew in RF, and after a hot start he tailed off to 269/354/338, -5.

OSU pitching and defense was fourth in the Big Ten with 5.27 park adjusted RA/G, versus the 6.09 average, despite serious injury problems on the staff. Senior Dan DeLucia, the ace for the past two years, was 2-0 in three starts before requiring Tommy John surgery; he will receive a medical redshirt and pitch for the Bucks in 2008. Junior Cory Luebke stepped up big as the staff ace, going 9-1 with a 3.54 RA, 3.19 eRA, 7.5 KG, and +33 RAA, enough to be Big Ten Pitcher of the Year. He was signed by San Diego as a third round pick.

Sophomore JB Shuck lost some of his form from his freshman season, as he did at the plate, but took his turn each weekend and put up a 5.58 RA and +5 RAA, although his 6.56 eRA was scary. As a freshman he benefited from a low percentage of hits on BIP; in 2007, he was hit for 32.5%. An injury to projected #4 starter, sophomore Josh Barerra, kept OSU from ever establishing a stable rotation. Barerra was 4-1, +2 in 8 games and 5 starts in his shortened campaign. A variety of freshman were used as starters: Theron Minium (1-2, 13 G, 5 GS, 7.88, -6); Eric Best (3-1, 20 G, 4 GS, 4.97, +5); and Josh Edgin (2-2, 19 G, 7 GS, 6.55, -2). Eventually, would-be relievers, junior Rory Meister (4-7, 22 G, 5 GS, 3 SV, 5.80, +1) and sophomore Jake Hale (4-3, 26 G, 4 GS, 4.64, +11) got starts. By tournament time, Hale had reestablished himself in his 2006 rotation slot, while Meister was back to being the closer. Senior Trey Fausnaugh also was a key reliever, appearing in 16 games with a 6.95 RA and -2 RAA.

What was incredible about OSU pitching was the degree to which it was left-handed dominated. DeLucia, Luebke, Shuck, Barerra, Minium, Best, and Edgin are all southpaws. OSU lefties were 25-11 in 363 innings for +36 RAA; but the righties were just 13-13 in 160 innings for -1 RAA.

While it is way too early to make a prognosis for 2008, my early impression is that the 2003 Dodgers will be the most comparable team of recent major league memory. Losing the top three hitters from the team will be a difficult pill to swallow, and while youngsters like Dew, Kovanda, and Rupert figure to improve, it’s difficult to see a lot of power. On the other hand, even after losing Luebke, the pitching should be deep and outstanding. Without formally studying the matter, it has been my observation that freshman pitchers often make huge steps forward with experience under their belt. But it won’t take many to fill out a great staff; if Best can maintain his form, and just one of Minium, Edgin, and Barerra can be a solid starter, then you have a pretty good three-fourths of the rotation plus a lefty and righty relief ace. I think it all points towards a sub-par .500 type season, but Bob Todd has surprised before and I still think the program is in excellent shape, although it would be nice to find some pop.

Tuesday, July 17, 2007

My Top 60 Starters, 11-20

20. Don Sutton (.543 NW%, 111 ARA, +29 WAA, +102 WAR)
19. Nolan Ryan (.530, 110, +27, +102)
18. Carl Hubbell (.600, 141, +47, +97)
17. Randy Johnson (.661, 130, +46, +99)
16. Jim Palmer (.559, 127, +46, +101)
15. Bob Gibson (.583, 127, +47, +101)
14. Phil Niekro (.552, 111, +32, +107)
13. Steve Carlton (.568, 113, +35, +107)
12. Bert Blyleven (.537, 118, +42, +111)
11. Gaylord Perry (.542, 114, +38, +112)

SUTTON & RYAN: They are very close, almost identical, in terms of value. I went with Ryan because his style certainly relied less on his defense. But it is amazing how big the disconnect in public opinion is, when in fact there is a good case to be made that they are equals. I’m not saying it’s puzzling that Ryan gets more ink, but it’s my impression that 90% of fans would be incredulous if you claimed these two belonged in the same league.

JOHNSON: Johnson could easily be ahead of Palmer, given the Ryan-type style issues, and the quality of Palmer’s teams. Perhaps with a career rejuvenation back in Arizona, he could move up…he only averaged about three WAR in two years in New York.

BLYLEVEN: I think enough has probably been written about him in the blogosphere, don’t you?

Seeing Niekro, Blyleven, and Perry ahead of Hubbell, Gibson, and Palmer may seem strange to a lot of people, but it again is a consequence of looking at career value above replacement. I’m running out of comments to make, because everybody already knows about these guys, and rating them highly doesn’t need any justification. We are also starting to get into the area where there are big gaps in WAR that make it tougher for me to just stick one pitcher in front of another because I feel like it.

Tuesday, July 10, 2007

My Top 60 Starters, 21-30

30. Mike Mussina (.622 NW%, 126 ARA, +37 WAA, +82 WAR)
29. Curt Schilling (.606, 130, +40, +83)
28. Ed Walsh (.602, 137, +44, +86)
27. Miner Brown (.605, 131, +44, +88)
26. Tom Glavine (.583, 119, +35, +93)
25. Whitey Ford (.646, 131, +42, +86)
24. Bob Feller (.601, 122, +38, +91)
23. Pedro Martinez (.680, 157, +53, +89)
22. Robin Roberts (.551, 114, +32, +97)
21. Fergie Jenkins (.557, 117, +36, +98)

MUSSINA: As we start hitting active pitchers, we have to be careful about jumping the gun, although as I’ve mentioned previously, the low baseline used here makes it hard for pitchers to lose too much ground.

SCHILLING: I’ve never been a particular fan of Schilling, but he’s got the credentials to be here. He’s always struck me as a self promoter (bloody sock), crybaby (Ben Davis’ bunt to breakup the perfect game), or a combination thereof (taking a bat to the Questec camera). But the man can pitch, and as MHS would want me to point out, his playoff performances have been unreal.

FORD & BROWN: These two are a pretty good match, stats-wise. They each pitched for dominant teams, and then all of their major measures match up pretty well, except the Chairman’s W-L record is more impressive. I give Ford a boost for pitching 146 World Series innings with a 2.71 ERA (although he was “only” 10-8), but Brown himself did some solid work in October (5-4).

FELLER: He is low here compared to other lists, because he is the great pitcher most hurt by my refusal to give WWII credit. If you conservatively give him sixteen more WAR, he’s in the top fifteen, at least.

MARTINEZ: There is no pitcher in history with a better ARA or NW%, although if he does pitch some more, he’ll likely decline in those categories (whether his standing on the all-time lists will decline is another matter). Some will claim that he is not durable enough, but his +89 WAR puts him in this class. I put him ahead of Glavine and Feller because of the (very slight) peak/WAA consideration (he is eighth all time in WAA, with only the top eight pitchers on my list ranking ahead of him), but it’s possible that he’ll work his way over them (and others) in WAR on his own. Or he could be almost done. Either way, he’s one of the greats.

ROBERTS & JENKINS: Bill James has written a few times about how they are a pretty good match for each other stylistically, and in the end, they had nearly equivalent value. They tower above the other pitcher that James put in that group (Catfish Hunter).

Tuesday, July 03, 2007

My Top 60 Starters, 31-40

40. Kevin Brown (.589 NW%, 122 ARA, +33 WAA, +78 WAR)
39. Stan Coveleski (.574, 126, +35, +78)
38. Juan Marichal (.614, 118, +30, +79)
37. Tommy John (.545, 107, +18, +83)
36. Ted Lyons (.559, 112, +25, +82)
35. John Smoltz (.557, 127, +36, +80)
34. Eppa Rixey (.514, 111, +22, +85)
33. Vic Willis (.529, 114, +26, +82)
32. Red Ruffing (.522, 111, +23, +83)
31. Red Faber (.552, 114, +27, +84)

BROWN: I don’t have any insight on this, but I assume he’ll be snubbed by the Hall voters, for a number of reasons. First, he’s not well-liked, by anybody. Second, he never got the credit he was due when he was pitching, at least I never thought that he did. Third, he is the least-impressive of a barrage of great pitchers who will hit the ballot within a few years of his doing so (Smoltz, Glavine, Maddux, Clemens, Johnson, Schilling), with Mussina and Pedro probably not that far behind. I think they are all worthy of the Hall, but I think Brown may have to wait until he’s long gone and the numbers speak louder then the other factors.

MARCICHAL: I was surprised to see the Dominican Dandy so low; he certainly does better in the W-L measures then he does in runs allowed. Bill James originally rated him in front of Gibson, but came around in the second edition of the Historical Abstract. Still a unique pitcher and one I would have loved to have watched.

JOHN: The first of two eligible pitchers on the ballot but not in the Hall. John is a career value special, as nobody that follows has less then 20 WAA. John recently agitated that he should be in Cooperstown, and while I agree, he can take comfort in knowing that barring some new advance in sports medicine, his name will remain in the forefront longer then a lot of pitchers who were better then he was.

SMOLTZ: He gets no extra credit here for the higher leverage innings in his three years of closing, either; of course, I also compared those innings to the lower replacement level for starters (.390), so things even out a bit.

WILLIS: Willis, a fairly recent Veterans’ Committee pick, is often put down as a bad one but I just don’t see it. His win-loss isn’t very impressive, but +63 WCR isn’t horrible. But he does well in run-based metrics, and he had three 10 WAR seasons, more then contemporaries like Plank and McGinnity. I see this moer as a wrong righted then a grievous blow to the sanctity of the Hall of Fame.

Sunday, July 01, 2007