## Tuesday, August 22, 2017

### Enby Distribution, pt. 4: Revisiting W%

In my first series about runs per game distributions, I wrote about how to use estimates of the probability of scoring k runs (however these probabilities were estimated, Enby distribution or an alternative approach) to estimate a team’s winning percentage. I’m going to circle back to that here, and most of the content is a repeat of the earlier post.

However, I think this is an important enough topic to rehash. In fact, a winning percentage estimator strikes me as the most logical application for a runs per game distribution, albeit one that is not particularly helpful to everyday sabermetric practice. After all, multiple formulas to estimate W% as a function of runs scored and runs allowed have been developed, and most of them work quite well when working with normal major league teams--well enough to make it difficult to imagine that there is any appreciable gain in accuracy to be had. Better yet, these W% estimators are fairly simple--even the most complex versions in common use, Pythagenport/pat, can be quickly tapped out on a calculator in about thirty seconds.

Given that there are powerful, relatively simple W% models already in use, why even bother to examine a model based on the estimated scoring distribution? There are three obvious reasons that come to my mind. The first is that such a model serves as a check on the others. Depending on how much confidence one has in the underlying run distribution model, it is possible that the resulting W% estimator will produce a batter estimate, at least at the extremes. We know of course that some of the easier models don’t hold up well in extreme situations--linear estimators will return negative or greater than one figures at some point, and fixed Pythagorean exponents will fray at some point. While we know that Pythagenpat works at the known point of 1 RPG and appears to work well at other extreme values, it doesn’t hurt to have another way of estimating W% in those extremes to see if Pythagenpat is corroborated, or whether the models disagree. This can also serve as a check on Enby--if the results vary too much from what we expect, it may imply that Enby does not hold up well at extremes itself.

A second reason is that it’s plain fun if you like esoteric sabermetrics (and if you’re reading this blog, it’s a good bet that you do). I’ve never needed an excuse to mess around with alternative methods, particularly when it comes to W% estimators, which along with run estimators are my own personal favorite sabermetric tools.

But the third reason is the one that I want to focus on here, which is that a W% estimator based on an underlying estimate of the run distribution is from one perspective the simplest possible estimator. This may seem to be an absurd statement given all of the steps that are necessary to compute Enby estimates, let alone plugging these into a W% formula. But from a first principles standpoint, the distribution-based W% estimator is the simplest to explain, because it is defined by the laws of the game itself.

If you score no runs, you don’t win. If you score one run, you win if you allow zero runs. If you score two runs, you win if you allow either zero or one run, and on it goes ad infinitum. If at the end of nine innings you have scored and allowed an equal number of runs, you play on until there is an inning in which an unequal, greater than zero number of runs are scored. This fundamental identity is what all of the other W% estimators attempt to approximate, the mechanics which they attempt to sweep under the rug by taking shortcuts to approximate. The distribution-based approach is computationally dense but conceptually easy (and correct). Of course, to bring points one and three together, the definition may be correct, but the resulting estimates are useless if the underlying model (Enby in this case) does not work.

In order to produce our W% estimate, we first need to use Enby to estimate the scoring distribution for the two teams. This is not as simple as using the Enby parameters we have already developed based on the Tango Distribution with c = .767. Tango has found that his method produces more accurate results for two teams when c is set equal to .852 instead.

In the previous post, I walked through the computations for the Enby distribution with any c value, so this is an easy substitution to make. But why is it necessary? I don’t have a truly satisfactory answer to that question--it's trite to just assert that it works better for head-to-head matchups because of the covariance between runs scored and runs allowed, even if that is in fact the right answer.

How will modifying the control value alter the Enby distribution? All of the parameters will be effected, because all depend on the control value in one way or another. First, B and r (the latter as it is initially figured before zero modification):

VAR = RG^2/9 + (2/c - 1)*RG
r = RG^2/(VAR - RG)
B = VAR/RG - 1

When c is larger, the variance of runs scored will be smaller. We can see this by examining the equations for variance with c = .767 and .852:

VAR (.767) = RG^2/9 + 1.608*RG
VAR (.852) = RG^2/9 + 1.347*RG

This results in a larger value for r and a smaller value for B, but these parameters don’t have an intuitive baseball explanation, unlike variance. It’s difficult to explain (for me at least) why variance of a single team’s runs scored should be lower when considering a head-to-head matchup, but that’s the way it works out.

It should be noted that if the sole purpose of this exercise is to estimate W%, we don’t have to care whether the actual probability of each team scoring k runs is correct. All we need to do is have an accurate estimate of how often Team A’s runs scored are greater than Team B’s.

By increasing c, we also reduce the probability of a shutout, as can be seen from the formula for z:

z =(RI/(RI + c*RI^2))^9

Originally, I had intended to display some graphs showing the behavior of the three parameters by RG with each choice of c, but these turned out to be not of any particular interest. I ran similar graphs earlier in the series with parameters based on the earlier variance model, and the shape of the resulting functions are quite similar. The only real visual difference when c varies is what appears to be linear shifts for r and B (the B shift is linear, the r not quite).

What might be more interesting is looking at how c shapes the estimated run distribution for a team with a given RG. I’ll look at three teams--one average (4.5 RG), one extremely low-scoring (2.25 RG), and one extremely high-scoring (9 RG). First, the 4.5 RG team:

As you may recall from earlier, Enby consistently overestimates the frequency with which a normal major league team will score 2-4 runs. Using the .852 c value exacerbates this issue; in fact, the main thing to take away from this set of graphs is that the higher c value clusters more probability around the mean, while the lower c value leaves more probability for the tails.

The 2.25 RG team:

And the 9 RG team:

## Thursday, August 10, 2017

### Bottoming Out

On June 5, OSU Athletic Director Gene Smith unceremoniously fired Thad Matta, the winningest men’s basketball coach in the history of the school. He did so months after the normal time to fire coaches had passed, and he did so in a way that ensured that the end of Matta’s tenure would be the dominant story in college basketball over the next week. Matta won four regular season Big Ten championships, went to two Final Fours, and was as close to universally respected and beloved by his former players as you will ever find in college basketball. He did all of this while dealing with a debilitating condition that made routine tasks like walking and taking off his shoes a major challenge; it was a side effect of a surgery performed at the university’s own hospital. OSU was coming off a pair of seasons without making the NCAA Tournament, but basketball is a sport in which a roster can get turned around in a hurry, and this author feels that Matta had more than earned another year or two in which to have the opportunity to do just that. Gene Smith felt otherwise.

On May 20, the OSU baseball team lost to Indiana 4-3 at home. This brought an end to a season in which they went 22-34, the school’s worst record since going 6-12 in 1974. They went 8-16 in the Big Ten, the worst showing since going 4-12 in 1987. The season brought Greg Beals’ seven-year record at OSU to 225-167 (.574) and his Big Ten record to 85-83 (.506). Setting aside 2008-2014, a seven-year stretch in which OSU had a .564 W% (since four of the seasons were coached by Beals), the seven-year record is OSU’s worst since 1986-1992. The seven-year stretch in the Big Ten is the worst since 1984-1990 (.486). The Buckeyes finished eleventh in the Big Ten, which in fairness wasn’t possible until the addition of Nebraska, but since the Big Ten eliminated divisions in 1988, the lowest previous conference standing had been seventh (out of 10 in 2010, out of 11 in 2014, out of 13 in 2015).

The OSU season is hardly worth recapping in detail, except to point out that baseball is such that Oregon State could go 56-6 on the year let have one of those losses come to the Buckeyes (February 24, 6-1; the Beavers won a rematch 5-1 two days later). The other noteworthy statistical oddity is that in eight Big Ten series, Ohio won just one (2-1 at Penn State). They were swept once (home against Minnesota) and the other six were all 1-2 for the opposition. The top eight teams in the conference qualify for the tournament; OSU finished four games out of the running, eliminated even before the final weekend.

The Buckeyes’ .393 overall W% and .412 EW% were both eleventh of thirteen Big Ten teams (the forces of darkness led at .724 and .748 respectively), and their .463 PW% was eighth (again, the forces of darkness led with .699). OSU was twelfth with 5.07 R/G and tenth with 6.05 RA/G, although Bill Davis Staidum is a pitcher’s park and those are unadjusted figures. OSU’s .659 DER was last in the conference.

None of this was surprising; OSU lost a tremendous amount of production from 2016, which was Beals’ most successful team, notching his only championship (Big Ten Tournament) and NCAA appearance. With individual exceptions, outside of the 2016 draft class, Beals has failed to recruit and develop talent, often patching his roster with copious amounts of JUCO transfers rather than underclassmen developed in the program. Never was this more acute than in 2017. None of this is meant to be an indictment of the players, who did the best they could to represent their school. It is not their fault that the coach put them in situations that they couldn’t handle or weren’t ready for.

Sophomore catcher Jacob Barnwell had a solid season, hitting .254/.367/.343 for only -1 RAA; his classmate and backup Andrew Fishel only got 50 PA but posted a .400 OBA. First base/DH was a real problem position, as senior Zach Ratcliff was -8 RAA and JUCO transfer junior Bo Coolen chipped in -6; both had secondary averages well below the team average. Noah McGowan, another JUCO transfer started at second (and got time in left as well), with -3 RAA in 162 PA before getting injured. True freshman Noah West followed him into the lineup, but a lack of offense (.213/.278/.303 in 105 PA) gave classmate Connor Pohl a shot. Pohl is 6’5” and his future likely lies at third, but his bat gave a boost to the struggling offense (.325/.386/.450 in 89 PA).

Senior Jalen Washington manned shortstop and acquitted himself fine defensively and at the plate (.266/.309/.468), and was selected by San Diego in the 28th round. Sophomore third baseman Brady Cherry did not build on the power potential his freshman year seemed to show, hitting four homers in 82 more PA than he had when he hit four in 2016. His overall performance (.260/.333/.410) was about average (-2 RAA).

Outfield was definitely the bright spot for the offense, despite getting little production out of JUCO transfer Tyler Cowles (.190/.309/.314 in 129 PA). Senior Shea Murray emerged from a pitching career marred by injuries to provide adequate production and earn the left field job (.252/.331/.449, 0 RAA) and was drafted in the 18th round by Pittsburgh, albeit as a pitcher. Junior center fielder Tre’ Gantt was the team MVP, hitting .314/.426/.426, leading the team with 18 RAA, and was drafted in the 29th round by Cleveland. True freshman right fielder Dominic Canzone was also a key contributor, challenging for the Big Ten batting average lead (.343/.398/.458 for 8 RAA).

On the mound, OSU never even came close to establishing a starting rotation due to injuries and ineffectiveness. Nine pitchers started a game, and only one of them had greater than 50% of his appearances as a starter. That was senior Jake Post, who went 1-7 over 13 starts with a 6.41 eRA. Sophomore lefty Connor Curlis was most effective, starting eight times for +3 RAA with 8.3/2.7 K/W. He tied for team innings lead with classmate Ryan Feltner, who was -13 RAA with a 6.71 eRA. Junior Yianni Pavloupous, the closer a year ago, was -10 RAA over 40 innings between both roles. Junior Adam Niemeyer missed time with injuries, appearing in just ten games (five starts) for -3 RAA over 34 innings. Freshman Jake Vance was rushed into action and allowed 20 runs and walks in 26 innings (-4 RAA). And JUCO transfer Reece Calvert gave up a shocking 39 runs in 39 innings.

I thought the bullpen would be the strength of the team before the season. In the case of Seth Kinker, I was right. The junior slinger was terrific, pitching 58 innings (21 relief appearances, 3 starts) and leading the team by a huge margin with 13 RAA (8.4/2.0 K/W). But the rest of the bullpen was less effective. Junior Kyle Michalik missed much of the season with injuries and wasn’t that effective when on the mound (6.85 RA and just 4.8 K/9 over 22 innings). Senior Joe Stoll did fine in the LOOGY role, something Beals has brought to OSU, with 3 RAA in 23 innings over 25 appearances. Junior Austin Woodby had a 6.00 RA over 33 innings but deserved better with a 4.79 eRA and 5.5/1.8 K/W. The only other reliever to work more than ten innings was freshman sidearmer Thomas Waning (3 runs, 11 K, 4 W over 12 innings). Again, it’s hard to describe the roles because almost everyone was forced to both start and relieve.

It’s too early to hazard a prognosis for 2018, but given the lack of promising performances from young players, it’s hard to be optimistic. What remains to be seen is whether Smith’s ruthlessness can be transferred from coaches who do not deserve it to those who have earned it in spades. No, baseball is not a revenue sport, and no, baseball is not bringing the athletic department broad media exposure. But when properly curated, the OSU baseball program is a top-tier Big Ten program, with the potential to make runs in the NCAA Tournament, and bring in more revenue than most of the “other” 34 programs that are not football or men’s basketball. Neglected in the hands of a failed coach, it is capable of putting up a .333 W% in conference play. Smith, not Beals, is the man who will most directly impact the future success of the program.