Monday, October 05, 2015

Crude Playoff Odds--2015

These are very simple playoff odds, based on my crude rating system for teams using an equal mix of W%, EW% (based on R/RA), PW% (based on RC/RCA), and 69 games of .500. They account for home field advantage by assuming a .500 team wins 54.5% of home games. They assume that a team's inherent strength is constant from game-to-game. They do not account for any number of factors that you would actually want to account for if you were serious about this, including but not limited to injuries, the current construction of the team rather than the aggregate seasonal performance, pitching rotations, estimated true talent of the players, and whatever Ned Yost sold to the devil.

These are the ratings that fuel the odds (CTR(H) is the team's rating with home field advantage included):

You'll note that the ratings love Houston much more than anyone else. thanks to their excellent EW% and PW%. The league disparity remains strong, with the average AL team (not playoff team) having a 107 rating with 100 being average. To the extent the ratings look odd, that is probably the largest driver; another is the fact that the NL East and West were the weakest divisions in MLB, so LA's SOS ranks 28th and NYN's ranks dead last. The Mets' average opponent is considered to be about equal to the White Sox; the Yankees' (who played the toughest schedule of any playoff team) is considered to be about equal to the...wait for it...Mets (actually, better than the Mets, 106 to 104).

The wildcard odds:

Very even matchups that actually slightly favor the visiting teams (remember, home team is assumed to win 54.5% if equal).

In the charts that follow, “P” is the probability that the series occurs; P(H win) is the probability that the home team wins should the series occur; and P(H) is the probability that the series occurs and that the home team wins [P*P(H win)].


The series I was most interested in without looking at any numbers was NYN/LA; while it still ranks as pretty competitive, it's the least competitive on paper other than TEX/TOR. Surprisingly (but thankfully), KC should have their hands full every step of the way, although obviously wildcards burning off their pitchers is not accounted for here.


The home team is favored in every LDS matchup, but that is decisively not the case here, with seven of the twelve possible LCS matchups featuring road favorites. This is due to the NL's top teams all hailing from the Central as the winner of STL/wildcard will be favored in any LCS matchup, along with TEX being considered the AL's weakest playoff participant but having home field should the wildcard knockoff KC.

World Series:

The NL is favored in just four of twenty-five possible matchups, namely those that feature the Rangers against not-the-Mets. STL is considered stronger than KC or NYA by the ratings, but home field advantage tips the odds to the junior circuit.

Putting it all together:

There's a 75% chance the World Series will be sufferable, which I think is decent. The AL has a 56.4% chance to win.

I lost a lot of Twitter followers last year by griping about the playoffs, particularly the Royals. So be it. The 2014 playoffs were the least enjoyable of my time as a fan. One factor was that the series weren't very good--there were a lot of sweeps and the like, until a terrific World Series. It wasn't extraordinarily bad in that respect, but there were fewer games than usual. There were a lot of very good individual games (at least until the World Series, which had an epic game seven that has washed away how blah most of it was out people's memories), but I'd prefer a better balance of series and game drama.

But what really irked me about the 2014 playoffs is how predictable they were. Many people praised the playoffs for their unpredictability, but I contend that in retrospect they were quite predictable in retrospect--the better team lost. Obviously the very existence of playoffs allows for the regular season results to be voided by short series results; too much so for my liking, as in my ideal world there would be four or two playoff teams (i.e. either 1969-1993 or pre-1969 format). The trend of history in every American sport is inexorably to further expand the playoff field.

I am fully aware of both of those facts--that short series often result in the lesser team winning, and that the playoffs are never going to be reduced in size. Accepting that reality does not, however, compel me to enjoy that reality, and I did not enjoy watching the better teams get beaten as a matter of course last October. I also find the style, attitude, and fan/media entitlement of the Royals to be insufferable, and thus I was particularly perturbed by the results.

At the risk of beating that dead horse, further points in my defense of my hatred of the 2014 postseason:

1. The better team almost always losing should not be what people mean when they say they like unpredictability in the playoff outcomes. That would involve the better team sometimes winning. It became very easy to predict (not with any assurance or confidence of accuracy in the moment, of course; I'm not suggesting the universe inevitably set the better teams to be defeated) the 2014 playoffs in short order after the horrid first set of games that saw three of four series go 2-0.

2. The Royals simply don't play the style of baseball I like. That's just my preference, not a sabermetric imperative or anything weighty like that, but I personally do not enjoy watching low secondary average baseball. Of course, the Royals started hitting home runs in the playoffs, so they were winning in large part due to the inverse of the narrative they were used to advance.

3. I don't begrudge anyone rooting for their team. Certainly I root for the Indians unequivocally when they are in the playoffs whether they are the best team or not. But it became really tiresome to hear about the Royals long playoff drought. I certainly do not believe that franchises are owed success thanks to fallow periods, but if I did, I would have started the list of worthy playoff participants elsewhere. After all, KC's drought was simply that they had gone thirty years without making the playoffs at all. They made the playoffs, they advanced from the wildcard round, they were in the playoffs. Why did that drought entitle their fans to more? The Tigers, Orioles, and Pirates all had longer World Series title droughts than the Royals. If people choose who to root for based on past suffering, the line should start there once you've advanced to the playoffs. There are a lot of fans of a lot of teams who have seen their teams make the playoffs multiple times and break their hearts once there, and they're supposed to pull for KC to win in their first shot? And while a thirty year playoff drought is excessive, a little bit of simple logic should tell you that given that there are thirty teams, thirty year world title droughts are not going to be even remotely remarkable in the future.

Hopefully this will be the last time I have occasion to rant about the 2014-15 Royals. May the Astros or Yankees do to them as they did to the Angels.

Tuesday, September 01, 2015

End of Season Stats Update

The end of season statistics I post have always walked a fine line between exhibiting a reasonable balance of accuracy and simplicity and veering to far into being needlessly inaccurate. That fundamental tension will not be removed with the changes I am making, but they will clean up a couple shortcuts that were too glaring for me to ignore any longer. I'm writing these changes up about a month in advance so that I don't have to devote any more space to them in the already bloated post that explains all the stats.

Runs Created

I've modified the knockoff version of Paul Johnson's Estimated Runs Produced that I use to calculate runs created to consider intentional walks, hit batters, and strikeouts. The idea behind using ERP, which is what I refer to as a "skeleton" form of linear weights, rather than using some other construct, is that I don't want to recalculate each and every weight every season. Instead, using fixed relationships between the various offensive events that hold fairly well across average modern major league environments is easy to work with from year-to-year and avoids giving the appearance of customization that explicit weights for each event would convey. Mind you, such a formula can still be expressed as x*S + y*D + z*T + ...

The previous version I was using was:

(TB + .8H + W + .7SB - CS - .3AB)*x, where x is around .322

To this formula I need to add IW and HB. This is all fairly straightforward--hit batters can count the same as walks, intentional walks will be half of a standard walk:

TB + .8H + W + HB - .5IW + .7SB - CS - .3AB

The rationale for counting intentional walks as half of a standard walk is that it is fairly close to correct (Tom Ruane's work suggests the ratio of IW value to standard walk value was .57 for 1960-2004). There are other possible approaches, such as removing IW altogether but assigning them the value of the batter's average plate appearance. There is certainly logic behind such a method; just doing it the simple way is a bit more conservative in terms of recognizing differences between batters.

Hit batters are actually slightly more valuable on average than walks due to the more random situations in which they occur, but such a distinction would be overkill given the approximate nature of the other coefficients.

I considered making adjustments for the other events included in the standard statistics (strikeouts, sacrifice hits, sacrifice flies, double plays) but ultimately chose to forego including each. The difference between a strikeout and a non-strikeout out is around .01 runs; given that there are numerous shortcuts already being taken, this is simply not enough for me to worry about in this context. Sacrifices and double plays are problematic due to the heavy contextual influences, although I came very close to just counting sacrifice flies the same as any other out. I would include K, SH, and SF if I was trying to do this precisely, but I would still leave double plays alone.

This was also a good opportunity to update the multipliers for all versions of the skeleton, which I did with the 2005-2014 major league totals to get these formulas:

ERP = (TB + .8H + W - .3AB)*.319 (had been using .324)
= .478S + .796D + 1.115T + 1.434HR + .319W - .096(AB - H)

ERP = (TB + .8H + W + .7SB - CS - .3AB)*.314 (had been using .322)
= .471S + .786D + 1.100T + 1.414HR + .314W + .220SB - .314CS - .094(AB - H)

ERP = (TB + .8H + W + HB - .5IW + .7SB - CS - .3AB)*.310
= .464S + .774D + 1.084T + 1.393HR + .310(W - IW + HB) + .155IW + .217SB - .310CS - .093(AB - H)

The expanded versions illustrate one of the weaknesses of the skeleton approach, or perhaps more precisely using total bases and hits rather than splitting out the hit types, as it results in the relationship between hit types being a bit off, particularly in the case of the triple. Still, I find the accuracy tradeoff acceptable for the purposes for which I use the end of season statistics.

For the batters who appeared in the 2014 end of season statistics, the biggest change switching to the version including HB and IW was five runs. Jon Jay, Carlos Gomez, and Mike Zunino gain five runs while Victor Martinez loses five runs. Of the 312 hitters, 263 (84%) change by no more than a run in either direction. So the differences are usually not material, another reason why I personally didn't mind the inaccuracy. But Carlos Gomez might disagree.

Along with the RC change are some necessary changes to other statistics. PA is now defined as AB + W + HB. OBA is (H + W + HB)/(AB + W + HB), and Secondary Average is (TB - H + W + HB)/AB, which is equal to SLG - BA + (OBA - BA)/(1 - OBA).

RAA for Pitchers

For as long as I've been running these reports, I've used the league run average as the baseline for Runs Above Average for both starters and relievers. This despite using very different replacement levels (128% of league average for starters and 111% for relievers). I've rationalized this somewhere, I'm sure, but the fundamental flaw is apparent when you look at my reliever reports and see three or four run gaps between RAA and RAR for many pitchers.

I want to avoid using the actual league average split for any given season, since it can bounce around and I'd rather use the league overall average in some manner. So my approach instead will be to look at the starter/reliever split in eRA (Run Average estimated based on component statistics, including actual hits allowed, so akin to Component ERA rather than FIP) for the last five league-seasons and see what makes sense.

The resulting difference in baseline between starters and relievers will not be as large as that exhibited in the replacement levels. The replacement level split attempts to estimate the true talent difference between the two roles, recognizing that most relievers would not be anywhere near as effective in a starting role. This adjustment is simply trying to compare an individual pitcher to what the composite league average pitcher would be estimated to have in his role (SP/RP) and does not account for our belief that the average starter is a better pitcher than the average reliever.

Additionally, using eRA rather than actual RA makes the adjustment more conservative than it otherwise might be, because it considers component performance rather than actual runs allowed. Part of the reliever advantage in RA is that the scoring rules benefit them. Why did I not then take this into account? I actually don't use RA in calculating pitcher RAA or RAR, I use a version of Relief RA, which was created by Sky Andrecheck and makes an adjustment for inherited runners (a simple one that doesn't consider base/out state, simply the percentage that score). The version I use considers bequeathed runners as well, so as to adjust starter's run averages for bullpen support as well. But the statistics on inherited and bequeathed runners by role for the league are not readily available, so I based the adjustment on eRA, which I already have calculated for each league-season broken out for starters and relievers.

This chart should be fairly self-explanatory: seRA is starter eRA, reRA is reliever eRA, eRA is the league eRA, s ratio = seRA/Lg(eRA), r ratio = reRA/Lg(eRA), and S IP% is the percentage of league innings thrown by starters. The relationships are fairly stable for the last five years, and so I have just used the simple average of the league-season s and r ratios to figure the adjustments.

RAA (for SP) = (LgRA*1.025 - RRA)*IP/9

RAA (for RP) = (LgRA*.951 - RRA)*IP/9

You can check my math as the weighted average of the adjustment is 1.025(.665) + .951(1 - .665) = 1.0002.

Sunday, August 16, 2015

Sunday, August 02, 2015

Great Moments in Yahoo! Box Scores

Am I surprised that Yahoo! box scores did not know how to handle SEA surrendering their DH position when Logan Morrison moved to first base? Of course not. It's still funny.

Thursday, July 23, 2015

1883 NL

The NL now had to share the major league stage with the AA, and it began to take act accordingly. Some combination of league “persuasion” and financial difficulty chased Troy and Worcester from the league. In their place, the NL returned to the two cities whose clubs were expelled after 1876, New York and Philadelphia. The two circuits would thus have their first head-to-head city battles.

Abraham Mills became the fourth president of the NL. According to Harold Seymour, one of his actions was to remove the team names from the official letterhead, as they tended to change so often. More significant changes were the expansion of the schedule to 98 games, switching to the Reach ball, eliminating first bound foul outs once and for all, and allowing the umpire to call for a new ball to be put in play at any time. These innovations were not copied by the upstart Association, with the exception of the expanded schedule.

Notable individual feats during the season included Monte Ward, now of New York, becoming the first pitcher to hit two homers in on game on May 3; Hoss Radbourn’s (PRO) 8-0 no-hitter against Cleveland on July 25 and One Arm Daily’s (CLE) 1-0 no-hitter versus hapless Philadelphia on September 13.

On May 30 (Memorial Day or Decoration Day or whatever it was called at the time), the NL tried a couple of two-city doubleheaders; Cleveland lost 3-1 at Boston, then won 5-2 at Providence. Taking their place was Buffalo, which started with a 4-2 loss in Providence and took the broom for the day as they lost 2-1 in Boston.

The pennant race was very competitive, with four teams in the mix. On July 7, Providence led the way at 33-16; Cleveland was two games back, but actually led by one in the loss column (30-15). Boston and defending champ Chicago were running third and fourth respectively. By August 20, Cleveland had the lead at 45-27 with Providence second. However, Cleveland lost two to Chicago and Providence two to Boston, bringing them right back into the hunt. The Reds went on to win six straight, but the Grays ended their streak and added another win in the first two of a series in Rhode Island. The third game on September 8 matched up the aces--Hoss Radbourn for the Grays and Jim Whitney for the Reds. Providence took the lead in the top of the eleventh, but Boston countered with two for a 4-3 win.

From that point on, Boston was in command, taking thirteen of fourteen and wrapping up the flag with a 4-1 victory over Cleveland on September 27. The final margin was four over the White Stockings, five over the Grays, and seven and a half over the Blues.

Perhaps Mills should have ordered some more stationary, as all eight clubs would be back. Peace with the AA came as well, but the tenuous new alliance would be tested immediately.


The NL continued to boast fine competitive balance with the exception of Philadelphia. The actual records were pretty close to what the runs scored and allowed would suggest.


The Reds (who according to Nemec were also being referred to as the Beaneaters around this time, all informally of course) won their third NL pennant, pulling to within one of Chicago for the lead. It was a mild surprise as they were third and ten back in 1882, needing to pass both the White Stockings and their New England rivals, the Grays.

Rookies Mike Hines and Paul Radford were serviceable, while Edgar Smith was also a rookie but really was only the nominal regular in center field. He played thirty games in the outfield but Jim Whitney played forty, being used as a regular when not pitching for the first time. While his ARG was down a bit, the extra playing time made his bat more valuable and he had a better year pitching (his best so far in fact).

Rookie hurler Charlie Buffinton gave Boston a pair of good pitchers, something they had not had since two pitchers had become the norm. The duo’s combined WAR of over ten paced the circuit.

John Morrill was replaced by Jack Burdock as manager mid-season. Meanwhile, Arthur Soden was operating behind the scenes. He had claimed for a few years that the team’s profits needed to be reinvested to improve the club, but after he continued to sing that tune after the pennant, many of the shareholders gave in and sold out.


The White Stockings kept their three-time pennant winning lineup largely intact; they cast off Hugh Nicol, shifted King Kelly back to the outfield, slid Tom Burns over to shortstop, and brought in Fred Pfeffer from Troy to play second.

If the second place finish must be laid at the feet of anyone, the previously brilliant pitching duo of Corcoran and Goldsmith would be the prime culprits. While they were still above average, they were now overshadowed by the Whitney/Buffinton duo in Boston and the Radbourn/replacement level #2 in Providence.

The White Stockings hammered Detroit 26-6 on September 6 on the strength of a record setting 18 runs in the seventh inning.


The Grays continued to close the gap on Chicago; since winning the 1879 flag, they had finished 15 behind Chicago, then nine, three, and finally one. Unfortunately for them, that meant a third place finish in 1883.

The team brought in three regulars from the defunct franchises; Arthur Irwin and Lee Richmond (the team’s #3 pitcher with 94 innings) from Worchester and John Cassidy from Troy. Rookie Cliff Carroll shared left with Richmond, and rookie Charlie Sweeney turned in a replacement-level performance as the #2 pitcher. With Radbourn earning his “Hoss” moniker by tossing 632 innings with the league’s best ARA, that was adequate enough.

There were rumors late in the summer that the club’s board of directors was going to close shop and instead shift their sporting interests to harness racing. Instead, perhaps due to displeasure over the supposed scheme, they voted to distribute the profits, then resigned. Providence would continue as a member of the National League.


The Blues picked up Bushong and Evans from Worcester, Daily from Buffalo, York from Providence, and Hotaling from Boston (he had played for Cleveland in 1880 as a rookie). They managed to get into contention largely on the strength of their brilliant keystone combo of Dunlap and Glasscock, both of whom I see as the all-star at their position for 1881-1883.

Had they combined the pitching they had boasted in previous years with this offense, they may have done more than just contend. Jim McCormick’s workload plummeted from 596 to 342 innings despite the expanded schedule (although his ARA held steady at 86). Neither One Arm Daily nor nineteen year old Will Sawyer, in his only big league campaign, contributed any value.

The Blues visited the White House in April. President Chester Arthur spoke to them, advising that “good ballplayers make good citizens”.


The Bisons finished with the same W% (.536) that they had in 1882. This is not too surprising as they returned all their regulars except Blondie Purcell (now with Philly) and One Arm Daily (Cleveland). However, Curry Foley was sidelined with various maladies of the joints, and only got 115 PA. Rookie Jim Lillie took his place in center field (see Brian McKenna’s thread on Foley at Baseball-Fever for more).

A profit of $5,000 was turned, which they put towards a new ballpark that, according to Phil Lowry in Green Cathedrals, cost $6,000. The team also wore new blue uniforms this season; ace Pud Galvin objected on the grounds that they made him look fat. No, Pud, the fat made you look fat.


The Gothams were controlled by John Day and Jim Mutrie, who also controlled the Metropolitans, the formerly independent and now AA club. Some players were shifted from the Mets to the Gothams, but around half of the New York regulars had played in the NL in 1882.

The top source of players was Troy, from whence came Ewing, Connor, Gillespie, and Welch (Hankinson and Caskin had last seen NL action with the Trojans in 1881). Dasher Troy came from Detroit (Dorgan had last played in the league with the Wolverines in 1881), Monte Ward from Providence, and Tip O’Neill was the lone rookie on the team. Given their wealth of experience for a first-year club, it is not surprising that they finished a respectable 46-50.

John Clapp was the manager of the team; he was also a reserve catcher (78 PA). This would make the end of Clapp’s remarkable major league career in which he managed six different teams all for one season each: the Mansfields of Middletown, CT in 1872; then, for four straight years beginning in 1878, Indianapolis, Buffalo, Cincinnati, and Cleveland; and finally the 1883 New Yorks.

The team’s debut, which was the first NL game ever played in New York City (the 1876 Mutuals actually played in Brooklyn which was a separate municipality at the time), was a 7-5 victory over eventual pennant winner Boston. The crowd included ex-President Ulysses S. Grant.


The Wolverines were mired near the bottom of the heap again; they had slipped to sixth and now seventh after an encouraging fourth in their inaugural campaign. Sam Trott, a reserve in 1882, moved into the lineup, and they regained the services of Sadie Houck who had not played in 1882. Tom Mansell split right field duties with rookie Dick Burns after having not played in the NL since 1879 with Syracuse. Burns and another rookie, Dupee Shaw, teamed up with Stump Wiedman as the primary pitchers.


It was a tough first year for the Phillies. The NL, seeking to get into Philadelphia where the AA’s Athletics had been a success, recruited Al Reach to back the team; he and partner Ben Shibe went in with lawyer John Rogers.

It may not be historically kosher, but I like to think of this club as the first expansion team in the modern sense. Most previous “expansions” had simply brought strong independent clubs into the circuit, but the Phillies included a group of castoffs and minor leaguers that more closely resembles modern expansion team composition. Their pathetic 17-81 record, worst in the NL since the league’s inaugural season (Cincinnati, 9-56) certainly doesn’t hurt the argument. They also used 29 players, a huge number for the time--the next highest was Buffalo with 18 and the median was 16.

Of the regulars, Ringo, Farrar, Coleman, and Hagan were rookies. The rest of the players (and last ML experience; 1882 if not listed): Gross (PRO, 1881), Ferguson (TRO), Warner (CLE, 1879), McClellan (PRO, 1881), Purcell (BUF), Harbidge (TRO), and Manning (BUF, 1881).

On Aguust 21, the Phillies were hammered 28-0 at Providence. Art Hagan was a Rhode Island native, and was left in to absorb the shellacking as the team did not want to disappoint the hometown fans that had come out to see him.

It was not a good year at the box office either, as the Athletics were reported to draw twice as many fans as any NL team and four times as many as the Phililies. Bob Ferguson quit as manager mid-season and was replaced by Blondie Purcell.

Leaders and trailers:
1. Dan Brouthers, BUF (.374)
2. Roger Connor, NYN (.357)
3. George Gore, CHN (.334)
Trailer: Doc Bushong, CLE (.172)
1. Dan Brouthers, BUF (.397)
2. Roger Connor, NYN (.394)
3. George Gore, CHN (.377)
Trailer: Stump Wiedman, DET (.196)
Trailing non-pitcher: Doc Bushong, CLE (.198)
1. Dan Brouthers, BUF (.572)
2. John Morrill, BSN (.525)
3. Roger Connor, NYN (.506)
Trailer: Doc Bushong, CLE (.195)
1. John Morrill, BSN (.243)
2. Charlie Bennett, DET (.240)
3. Dan Brouthers, BUF (.235)
Trailer: Stump Wiedman, DET (.048)
Trailing non-pitcher: Doc Bushong, CLE (.056)
1. Dan Brouthers, BUF (112)
2. Roger Connor, NYN (102)
3. Ezra Sutton, BSN (92)
4. George Gore, CHN (92)
5. Jim O’Rourke, BUF (91)
The expanded schedule enabled Brouthers and Connor to become the first National Leaguers to create an estimated 100 runs in a season.
1. Fred Dunlap, CLE (194)
2. Dan Brouthers, BUF (191)
3. Roger Connor, NYN (189)
4. Ezra Sutton, BSN (159)
5. George Gore, CHN (157)
Trailer: Stump Wiedman, DET (45)
Trailing non-pitcher: Frank Ringo, PHI (53)
1. Fred Dunlap, CLE (+4.5)
2. Dan Brouthers, BUF (+4.4)
3. Roger Connor, NYN (+4.2)
4. Ezra Sutton, BSN (+3.0)
5. George Gore, CHN (+2.7)
Trailer: Stump Wiedman, DET (-2.6)
Trailing non-pitcher: Davy Force, BUF (-2.0)
1. Fred Dunlap, CLE (+6.4)
2. Dan Brouthers, BUF (+5.4)
3. Roger Connor, NYN (+5.3)
4. Ezra Sutton, BSN (+4.8)
5. Buck Ewing, NYN (+4.4)
Trailer: John Humphries, NYN (-.9)
Humphries was the Gothams’ #2 catcher behind Ewing. He made 85 outs in 108 PA, hitting .112/.120/.121 and creating just one run. Another Gotham reserve, outfielder Gracie Pierce, is next on the trailing list, making 50 outs in 63 PA, hitting .081/.095/.113 and creating just one run.
1. Hoss Radbourn, PRO (72)
2. Jim Whitney, BSN (74)
3. Charlie Buffinton, BSN (83)
4. Larry Corcoran, CHN (86)
5. Jim McCormick, CLE (86)
Trailer: Art Hagan, PHI (178)
1. Hoss Radbourn, PRO (+4.7)
2. Jim Whitney, BSN (+3.4)
3. Pud Galvin, BUF (+2.1)
4. Larry Corcoran, CHN (+1.7)
5. Charlie Buffinton, BSN (+1.5)
Trailer: John Coleman, PHI (-7.5)
1. Hoss Radbourn, PRO (+8.1)
2. Jim Whitney, BSN (+7.8)
3. Charlie Buffinton, BSN (+2.8)
4. Pud Galvin, BUF (+2.2)
5. Monte Ward, NYN (+2.1)
Trailer: John Coleman, PHI (-5.6)

My all-star team:
C: Buck Ewing, NYN
1B: Dan Brouthers, BUF
2B: Fred Dunlap, CLE
3B: Ezra Sutton, BSN
SS: Jack Glasscock, CLE
LF: George Wood, DET
CF: George Gore, CHN
RF: Orator Shaffer, BUF
P: Hoss Radbourn, PRO
P: Jim Whitney, BSN
P: Charlie Buffinton, BSN
MVP: 2B Fred Dunlap, CLE
Rookie Hitter: C Mike Hines, BSN
Rookie Pitcher: Charlie Buffinton, BSN

I gave George Wood the nod in left field as he was close to the top in WAR (Tom York and Jim O’Rourke were in the mix as well), but Pete Palmer has him at +7 in the field, easily the best of those three. Again, the right fielders were a weak crop; Paul Hines, the runner-up in center field, was 1.7 WAR better than Shaffer.

The pitchers were the same pair as last season, but in reverse order. Radbourn led the league in ARA (meaning he was the most effective on a per inning basis) and tossed 632 innings, second only to Pud Galvin’s 656, an unbeatable combination even for Whitney’s bat. I also added a third spot as the AA averaged close to three 100 IP pitchers per team.

It was another very weak year for rookie hitters; while Mike Hines only put up a 70 ARG, I felt that being the catcher for a pennant-winning team should probably count for something--and it’s not as if he’s taking it away from a guy who had a great year (the top rookie hitter in WAR is Cliff Carroll, +.9 and also a below-average hitter).

Saturday, July 11, 2015

Collapse, pt. 2

For the second time in three years, OSU baseball entered May in excellent position to secure the program's first NCAA tournament berth since 2009, projected as a #2 seed with an outside shot of earning a #1 and hosting a regional. For the second time in three years, it all came crashing down around hapless coach Greg Beals. This one was even tougher to swallow. In 2013, the crash mostly came in non-conference games against tough national opponents (Georgia Tech, Louisville, Oregon), and the Buckeyes still came close to a share of the Big Ten title. In 2015, OSU tumbled down the Big Ten standings, losing eight of their final nine conference games to fall to seventh in the league.

Despite this catastrophic failure, the stagnation of the program under Beals' stewardship, and the expiration of his inital contract, it appears as if Beals will be invited back for a sixth season leading the OSU baseball program. Under previous coach Bob Todd, the Buckeyes and Minnesota duked it out for conference supremacy, a veritable big two and little eight on the diamond. While Todd's program slipped a bit near the end of his tenure, he still made semi-annual NCAA appearances and captured a final regular season crown in 2009. Under Beals, OSU has clearly fallen behind at least Indiana, Illinois, and newcomers Nebraska and Maryland in the Big Ten pecking order.

The Big Ten got five teams into the NCAA Tournament: Indiana, Iowa, the forces of evil, Maryland, and Illinois, with the latter two winning their regionals. But the overall performance of conference teams only adds to the frustration for OSU supporters, as the Bucks finished 35-19 (.648), third in the Big Ten (Illinois led at 50-10, .833). In EW%, OSU was fifth at .636 (Illinois led at .783), and in PW% OSU was third at .643 (again, the Illini led at .748). OSU tied for fourth with 5.63 runs/game against a conference average of 5.36 and sixth with 4.22 RA/game against an average of 4.87.

OSU's offense was paced by its outfield, with the three primary starters ranking 1-2-3 on the team in RAA. Sophomore left fielder Ronnie Dawson took a step back from his debut campaign, but still hit .279/.357/.465, ranked second on the team with 7 longballs, and created 6.3 RG for +9 RAA. Classmate leadoff man and center fielder Troy Montgomery broke out in a big way, hitting .317/.424/.493 for 8.7 RG and +22 RAA. And senior right fielder Pat Porter played himself into being a fifteenth round pick of Houston with a bounceback .338/.414/.576, eleven homer, 9.4 RG, +25 RAA season that also saw him set the school's career triples record.

The platoon of senior catchers Aaron Gretz and Conor Sabanosh was fairly effective, with 176 and 189 PA respectively, Gretz created 6.1 runs/game and +5 RAA, Sabanosh 5.0 and +1, although it once again mystified this observer that Beals showed a degree favoritism towards Sabanosh in doling out playing time. First base was a major weakness. Jacob Bosiokovic missed most of the season, taking one option out of play. Junior Ryan Leffel struggled at the plate, hitting .211/.304/.267 for 3.3 RG and -4 RAA in 109 PA, while classmate Zach Ratcliff hit well (7.1 RG) in limited opportunities (64 PA). Eventually junior Troy Kuhn saw time at first after starting the season at the hot corner, and was Ohio's most productive infielder with 5.4 RG for +2 RAA in 187 PA.

After Kuhn shifted across, the diamond, junior second baseman Nick Sergakis moved to third. Sergakis did not reprise his strong 2014 campaign with a .250/.320/.330, 4.3 RG, -3 RAA season. Sophomore L Grant Davis plugged in at second, hitting .282/.320/.353, 4.7 RG, -1 RAA over 102 PA. And an early hot streak kept junior Craig Nennig from a third straight dismal offensive performance, but he still only hit .266/.327/.330 for 4.3 RG and -3 RAA.

There was no regular DH, so the only other Buckeye who got more than 50 PA was freshman outfielder Tre' Gantt, who showed promise with speed and a .311/.378/.351, 5.6 RG, +2 RAA performance over 85 PA--he should be a shoe-in for the vacant outfield spot. Freshman catcher/DH/pinch-hitter Jordan McDonough showed some gap power with six doubles in 41 PA (4.7 RG). Sophomore IF/C Jalen Washington and junior OF Jake Brobst served mostly in pinch-running roles, combining for just 37 PA.

OSU's starting pitching was solid, but that's about the strongest praise that can be offered. Sophomore lefty Tanner Tully was slotted as the #1 but not surprisingly took a big step back from his Freshman of the Year campaign with a 5.04 RA (and even more distressing 5.75 eRA) and -3 RAA over 75 innings. His strikeout rate ticked up from 5.1 to 5.3, which tells much of the story. Sophomore Travis Lakins moved into the rotation but was just average (4.78 RA for -1 RAA with a similar eRA in 96 innings), but clearly was the best mound prospect on the team and was draft eligible, signing with Boston after being a sixth round pick. Senior Ryan Riga was OSU's best pitcher and was drafted in the thirteen round by the White Sox after positing a 3.38 RA for +12 RAA over 97 innings).

Freshman Jacob Niggemeyer got the most mid-week starting assignments with seven, but will need to improve on a 4.09 RA, 5.35 eRA, and 4.1 K/9 performance to be a strong candidate for weekend starts in 2016. Redshirt freshman Adam Niemeyer worked in something of a long relief role, pitching 33 innings over 12 appearances (4 starts) with a 2.16 RA and 3.79 eRA for +9 RAA to rank second to Riga on the team. Junior lefty John Havird (3.58 RA, 4.17 eRA in 27 innings) will also be in that mix.

The Buckeye bullpen struggled immensely, particularly down the stretch and in the Big Ten Tournament. In the last regular season weekend at Indiana, the bullpen failed to hold a 4-3 eighth inning lead in the opener, then surrendered two runs with the game tied in the eighth in the finale. In the Tournament, closer Trace Dempsey yielded a two-out, two-strike homer in the opener against Iowa that turned a 2-1 lead into a 3-2 loss. Scarred by the experience, Beals stuck with his ace Riga in the eighth inning of a 2-2 elimination game against the Hoosiers; they struck for three and ended OSU's season, 5-3.

Dempsey's senior season saw him once again unable to catch his sophomore lightning in a bottle--he was average but not brilliant (4.46 RA, 3.98 eRA, +1 RAA, with 8.4 K/9 against 2.4 W/9, the latter a marked improvement from 4.9 in 2014). The rest of the pen was weakened by a late season injury to junior Jake Post, who was the best Buckeye reliever with a 3.03 RA, 4.05 eRA, +6 RAA over 29 innings. Freshman Seth Kinker pitched well (2.82 RA with similar eRA for +5 RAA, 7.7 K/1.2 W over 22 innings0 and marks a continuation of one of the few positives of Beals' style--a fondness for relievers with less than over-the-top deliveries. As the season progressed Kinker took some high leverage work away from redshirt freshman Kyle Michalik, who pitched better than his traditional stats might indicate, albeit in only 19 innings (5.21 RA but 2.92 eRA). Senior Michael Horejsei really only had his left-handedness to offer him as a key reliever, ranking second to Dempsey with 19 appearances but tossing just 14 1/3 innings with a 6.91 RA and 5.57 eRA. Redshirt sophomore Shea Murray came back from an arm injury to throw seven ineffective but exciting innings (7.04 RA, 4.7 W, 14.1 K); his stuff was good enough for Texas to take a flier on him in the 39th round.

As far as the state of the program goes, there's really nothing to be said that I haven't already. Perhaps one could credit Beals for some apparent development by offensive players (Montgomery in particular comes to mind), but his track record in that regard is still quite sketchy. The dreadful baserunning and bizarre infatuation with the runners at the corners, two out double steal show no sign of abating, the late season collapse is fast becoming a staple, and while a 35-20 record doesn't look so bad, Beals' five-year body of work is 159-125 (.560), the program's worst stretch of that length since 1986-1990 (.500), except for the overlapping 2010-2014 period (.543). The same holds true for conference play where Beals is 49-47 (.510). The six-year NCAA Tournament drought is the longest since OSU went eight years without qualifying 1983-1990. It's time for OSU to once again have a baseball program it's football and basketball programs can be proud of, and it seems likely that someone other than Beals would be best positioned to make that happen.

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

Great Moments in Yahoo! Box Scores

I think this means I've won. They've finally just given up.