Distributing Pitching Win Shares to Individuals
The main component of the individual pitcher’s “Claim Points” formula is very similar to that of the only criteria for batters: Marginal Runs. For pitchers, we also consider W, L, and SV, something called “Save Equivalent Innings”, and the sub-marginal batting performances of pitchers.
We start by calculating the zero-level. This is simply the 152% of the league rate of runs/ 9 innings:
ZL = LgRA*PF(R)*1.52
The 1993 NL RA was 4.521, the Braves PF(R) is .998, and so the ZL for the Braves is 4.521*.998*1.52 = 6.858. But this is the zero-level for the defense as a whole; it includes fielders and pitchers. So we find the PZL, or Pitcher ZL, as:
PZL = ZL - (ZL - RA)*Field%
The Braves’ RA was 3.458, and the Field%(Field% is not the team Fielding Percentage, although I can see why the abbreviation I chose might make some think that. It is the percentage of defensive win shares that has been assigned to the team’s fielders) was .297, so the PZL is 6.858 - (6.858 - 3.458)*.297 = 5.848. So Braves pitchers will get credit for their marginal runs saved compared to a 5.848 RA pitcher.
In WS, unearned runs are counted as one half for the purpose of calculating RA. So ER + .5(R - ER) simplifies to (R + ER)/2, which allows us to write this formula:
PCL-1 = IP/9*PZL - (R + ER)/2
We’ll run through these steps for a starter and a reliever. Steve Avery pitched 223 innings and allowed 81 R and 73 ER, so his PCL-1 is 223/9*5.848 - (81+73)/2 = 67.90. Mike Stanton pitched 52 innings allowing 35 R and 27 ER, for a PCL-1 of 52/9*5.848 - (35+27)/2 = 2.78.
The second criteria used for pitchers is a combination of W, L, and SV:
PCL-2 = (3*W - L + SV)/3
Avery was 18-6 with no saves, for (3*18-6)/3 = 16, while
The third criteria is for “Save Equivalent Innings”. This is designed to give extra credit to relief pitchers for the high leverage value of their innings. SEI = 3*SV + HLD, with the caveat that this figure cannot be greater then 90% of the pitcher’s actual IP. Avery had no saves or holds, and therefore has 0 SEI and will get 0 PCL-3.
Then claim points are given by the marginal runs saved, over your SEI, based on RAC(discussed above):
PCL-3 = (PZL - RAC)*SEI/9
(This is one case where my input numbers will differ from reality, because I do not have hold data for Steve Bedrosian or Jay Howell in 1993, but I do for the other Braves relievers.)
The final criteria for pitchers is their hitting performance, if it was sub-marginal. This is PCL-4. Marginal Runs hitting was already calculated when we distributed OWS to individuals. But we zeroed out negative MR; here we count them against pitchers. Mike Stanton did not bat in 1993 and therefore has 0. Steve Avery created 3.83 runs while making 72 outs. A marginal player making 72 outs would have created 8.32 runs, so Avery is -4.49 runs. This is PCL-4.
We then sum PCL-1 through PCL-4 for all players, zeroing out negative numbers.
My take: The zeroing out issue that I railed against in the offensive section is prevalent here as well, so I will not harp on it again.
One part that I am not sure about is the use of a different Zero Level for pitchers then for the defense as a whole. We already assigned a given number of Win Shares to the pitchers based on our assessment of the percentage of defensive value attributable to the pitching staff. Then we use this Pitch/Field breakdown again to find the ZL. This may be double-counting, but I am not sure about it to be honest. The effect of this decision is to have a lower ZL, so this helps better pitchers claim more Win Shares. Great pitchers already seem to be shortchanged, so if what I thinking is true, they would do even worse. Perhaps I am wrong, or just missing something really obvious here.
Some people will question the use of actual decisions in the evaluation, because these of course are dependent on many factors beyond the pitcher’s control. However, in a value method, there is potentially some “hidden” information in there. The weight given to the decisions is much lower then the weight on marginal runs. There are pros and cons, and I am ambivalent on the issue.
The third step, giving extra credit to relievers, is justifiable in a value method because they do pitch in situations in which runs are more valuable, if you use a real-time approach to value. So while the specifics of the step seem to be a guess, it is alright. Using RAC instead of actual RA is a little confusing in a value method, but James cites the misleading nature of reliever’s ERA due to inherited and bequeathed runners. If we could use actual inherited and bequeathed runners data, this would be preferable, but we don’t have that historically, so I can swallow RAC as a stand-in.
The fourth step of subtracting credit for sub-marginal offense is baffling. First of all, lumping it in with pitching means that pitching win shares incorporates offensive performance for bad hitters and does not for good pitchers. That means PWS is not a true isolation of pitching. Even more befuddling, a full-time hitter like Alfredo Griffin in 1981 does not have his value reduced by his horrific hitting, but Steve Avery does. It would be much easier to just allow Avery to have a negative OWS but then have his PWS be truly reflective of his pitching instead of including his offense. Again, the forced zeroing out of negative marginal runs comes back to create problems in Win Shares.